The paper presents conditions for non-parametric identification of a joint distribution when the marginal distributions are identified and the joint distribution is partially identified. Specifically, the paper considers the problem of estimating a J-dimensional Roy Model and shows that the joint distribution is identified up to an approximation. The paper extends Heckman and Honore (1990) by providing an additional identification result with reasonable data requirements and without strong parametric assumptions. The result is applied to private value sealed bid auctions where bidders face competing auctions for substitutes, such as in auction platforms like eBay or
Introduction
Consider the classic problem of estimating the outcomes for two alternative treatments, Treatment A and Treatment B. Generally we are interested in comparing outcomes for the two treatments so that we can make policy recommendations as to the "best" treatment. We would like to know each person's outcome for both treatments, in other words we want to know the joint distribution of outcomes across the two treatments. However, as humans are not lab rats we cannot know person i's outcome for Treatment B when person i received Treatment A. It is therefore standard to consider an alternative problem, that of comparing the average treatment outcomes under the two treatment regimes, i.e. "the average treatment effect". For the most part the econometric literature has dealt with the problem of selection bias in measuring the average treatment effect. In contrast, this paper considers the problem of identifying and estimating the joint distribution. The paper argues that identification is possible with data requirements that are only moderately larger than what is used to estimate the average treatment effect, but without parametric assumptions suggested by Heckman and Honore (1990) .
Identification of the joint distribution requires three steps. The first step is to identify the marginal distributions. The paper assumes the marginal distributions are identified through standard approaches such as randomized control trials. The auction section appeals to the Athey and Haile (2002) result that the value distribution is identified from order statistics from auctions without competition. The second step is to partially identify the joint distribution. The paper shows that in the Roy model a set of joint probabilities can be estimated for given vector of exogenously set prices. This step is somewhat more involved in the auction section because the result must be proved for equilibrium behavior with competing auctions. In both cases the intuition comes from revealed preferences and the structural assumption that those choosing between treatments observe their outcome under both treatments and observe prices then choose the treatment with the highest net utility. The third step involves taking the estimates from the first two steps and using them to estimate the parameters of a "copula" function. The paper shows that this estimated function approximates the actual joint distribution. Heckman and Honore (1990) present a number of results for identification in the Roy model. The authors show joint distribution is partially identified for a given set of prices. The authors further show that if we observe a large enough set of prices we can non-parameterically identify the full joint distribution. Note that if we are able to determine the full joint distribution then we can determine the actual marginal distributions for each outcome and such things as the average treatment effect. The practical problem is that we do not in general observe such a large set of different prices. The authors also show that if we are willing to assume that the joint distribution of outcomes is parameterized by a bivariate normal distribution then the distribution is identified from the observed joint probabilities for just one set of prices. While this result has led to standard techniques for estimating the average treatment effect, it's reliance on particular parametric assumptions is of concern. Fox and Gandhi (2009) present identification results that also generalize the results presented in Heckman and Honore (1990) . In particular, the authors show how other observable characteristics of the decision maker and the choice can be used to identify the joint distribution and sufficient conditions for such identification.
Here it is argued that identification of the joint distribution is possible without the strong parametric assumptions suggested by Heckman and Honore (1990) but still with reasonable data requirements. That said, the standard Roy model makes strong assumptions on the choice process. In particular the model assumes the decision maker and the econometrician have access to the same set of signals regarding the likely outcome of the treatment. This may be problematic if the decision maker observes a private signal of the outcome and the econometrician observes a public signal. In the auction setting the assumption seems reasonable because the observed auction prices allow the econometrician to infer the outcome signal observed by the bidder. It may not be fine in a health setting where the patient and the doctor observe the "expected outcome" while the econometrician observes the actual outcome of the chosen treatment.
1
Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) may be the most infamous example of the importance of estimating joint distributions. David Li proposed a parametric copula function to estimate the joint distribution over default rates that used information on the marginal distributions and a correlation estimate (Li (2000) ). Li's formula became a mainstay in pricing CDOs and is now blamed for the financial crisis of 2008 (Salmon (2009 ).
2
Parametric copulas have also been used to estimate the joint distribution of population statistics (Romeo (2005) ). While there is a literature on using various approximations of the copula function to estimate the joint distribution (Trivedi and Zimmer (2007) ), there does not seem to be a lot of work where the copula is used as part of the identification procedure itself.
3 A notable exception is Brendstrup and Paarsch (2007) who consider a case where bidders bid in two auctions for two differentiated goods and their utility is additively separable over the two items (fish in their case). Brendstrup and Paarsch (2007) assume that the copula has certain properties, in particular it is assumed to be from the family of Archimedean copulas. Here, the paper makes no assumption about the copula, but rather derives properties for the copula from assumptions about the joint distribution function, particularly the continuity assumption. For the most part the empirical auction literature has assumed that auctions occur in isolation and that a series of observed prices or bid vectors can be used to estimate the underlying one-dimensional value distribution. This may be a reasonable assumption in some situations possibly including timber auctions. However, it does not seem particularly reasonable when modeling demand on an auction platform like eBay. A notable exception is 1 This problem seems to be related to entry models in auctions. The assumption of the Roy model is equivalent to the assumption that auction participants observe their value for the item prior to entry. Marmer et al. (2012) present non-parametric identification results for an auction model where the decision maker may use one signal to enter the auction and a different but related signal in choosing how much to bid.
2 Zimmer (2012) shows that the Gaussian copula proposed by Li predicts greater independence between housing prices across U.S. States than the data warrants. 3 Thanks to Bruce Hansen for pointing this out the literature analyzing bidding dynamics across auctions (Backus and Lewis (2009), Zeithammer (2006) , Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) ). There has been no empirical work explicitly account for and use auction choice in the estimation procedure. To the extent that researchers interested in estimating the marginal distribution for a particular item are not accounting for competition, they will be estimating a weighted average of the marginal distribution where the weighting is a function the amount of competition the auction faces. This is equivalent to the selection problem illustrated by the Roy model. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the main general identification result that applies Sklar's theorem to the problem of identifying the joint distribution when the marginal distributions are known and the joint distribution is partially known. Section 3 presents the identification results for a standard Roy model. Section 4 presents the identification results for a private value sealed bid auction model. Section 5 concludes.
Identification of the Joint Distribution
The section considers a situation where the econometrician is interested in completely identifying the joint distribution v,v] and each j ∈ {1, ..., J} and joint probabilities for a subset of the domain (F (v * ) for
Under what circumstances is this enough information to identify the joint distribution? Sklar's Theorem allows for the existence of a copula function that maps between the observed marginal distributions and the observed joint probabilities. However, Sklar's theorem does not provide much guidance as to this function's form or whether it has a finite set of parameters. Below, it is shown that any copula function can be approximated by a finite polynomial. Thus, at worst, we are limited to identifying an approximation of the copula function. However there is no guarantee that the finite polynomial that we are able to identify on the subset of the domain, is the same finite polynomial that is "close" to the copula function. It is shown below that we are able to estimate coefficients of a polynomial and that these coefficients approximate the coefficients of the polynomial that approximates the copula function. In this sense the function we are able to identify approximates the actual joint distribution.
Assumption 1 states that the joint distribution F maps from the Jdimensional Reals to [0, 1] . The following theorem is due to Sklar. It states that there exists a unique mapping between the joint distribution and the marginal distributions.
Theorem 1 (Sklar (1959)) Let F be a J dimensional distribution with marginals F 1 , ..., F J . Then there exists a J dimensional copula C such that for all
If F 1 , ..., F J are continuous then C is unique. Conversely, if C is a J dimensional copula and F 1 , ..., F J are distribution functions then F is a J dimensional distribution function with marginals F 1 , ..., F J .
On first viewing Sklar's Theorem is a surprising result. It is a little less surprising when one notes that a joint distribution F (x, y) can be re-written as a function of the inverse of the marginal distributions,
where u = G(x) and v = H(y). That is, the joint distribution itself is the copula function. The existence proof then relies on the existence of the appropriate inverse functions and their existence in turn relies on the monotonicity properties of distribution and joint distribution functions. In order to use Sklar's Theorem we need the following assumptions about the continuity of the distribution functions.
Assumption 2 F is continuous.
These assumptions state that the distribution function is continuous and "strictly increasing" over the whole domain. The definition below sums up the sufficient conditions on the data for identification.
and for all j ∈ {1, ..., J}.
(1) of Definition 1 states that the observed domain must include an open set around where the distribution function equals 1 (i.e. F (v)). This is not strictly necessary for the proof, however the variable parts of the polynomial will tend to zero as the order of the estimated polynomial increases. If observations close to where the distribution function equals 1 are not included, then it will make estimation of the parameters more difficult and reduce faith in those estimates. (2) of Definition 1 states that the marginal density function may not have flat spots, at least no flat spots with positive measure. This helps to guarantee that there exists a matrix of observed probabilities that has full rank and is thus invertible. Given Sklar's theorem, the continuity assumptions and conditions on the observed joint probabilities the following theorem states that for any choice of the order of the polynomial there exists a small number such that a polynomial is never further away from the copula function than the small number. Moreover, as this small number goes to zero, the probability that an identified polynomial of the same order will be less than some distance from the actual distribution across the whole domain goes to 1.
The proof of theorem shows that it is straightforward to show there exists a polynomial that can be estimated on the subset of the domain where the joint probabilities are observed. Moreover, that estimated polynomial can be arbitrarily close to the polynomial that approximates the copula when the domain is limited to the subset. The difficult part is that there is no guarantee the estimated polynomial is "close" to the approximation of the copula in the rest of the domain. The solution presented in the proof is to show that the coefficients of the estimated polynomial approximate the coefficients of the polynomial that approximates the actual copula. While it is clear that the coefficients of the polynomials are close, it is not clear that the estimated polynomial is close to the actual distribution function across the whole domain. To give the reader a sense of this issue, the paper presents some numerical analysis of the probability that the difference between estimated polynomial and the actual distribution will be less than 10 percentage points.
for all v ∈ V and a ∈ (0, 1), where Q K is a K-order polynomial whose (K + 1) J parameters are identified.
Proof. The proof proceeds in three steps.
Step 1 shows that there is a unique function C that maps from the observed marginals to the observed joint distribution which can be approximated by a K-order polynomial P N K on V .
Step 2 shows that a separate K-order polynomial Q K is identified on V * .
Step 3 shows that Q K can approximate F on V .
Step 1.
Step 1.1 By Sklar's Theorem (Theorem 1) there exists a copula C such that
By Assumption (2), F j is continuous for all j and by the first part of Sklar's Theorem, C is unique.
Step 1.2. By Theorem 2.10.7 (Nelson (1999)) C is uniformly continuous on [0, 1] J . By Stone-Weierstrass Theorem (Browder (1996) , p. 158), ∃ a sequence (P N K ) s.t.
for all x ∈ [0, 1] J and N K ∈ N and let P N K is the smallest order polynomial such that the condition (Equation (4)) holds, and K ∈ N is the order of the polynomial.
...
Step
which contradicts the assumption that P N L is the lowest order polynomial such that Equation (6) holds.
Step 1.4. Let K ∈ N. From Steps (1.2) and (1.3), ∃ > 0 s.t.
for all x ∈ [0, 1] J .
Step 2.
Step 2.1. By assumption that F is identified on V * and F j is identified on [v,v] for all j ∈ {1, ..., J} we can write
By (1) of Definition 1 the set V * is uncountable so there (K +1) J elements of V * for which we can write Equation (8). In matrix form that system of equations is
where
where the typical element is
Let the set of (K + 1) J elements of V * be denoted W * .
Step 2.2. X K must be of full rank. Case 1. X K has (K + 1) J linearly independent rows. X K is of full rank. Case 2. There is at least one element of V * used in F K where
and v , ..., v ... ∈ W * are used in F K and X K . By (2) of Definition 1, ∃v > v where v ∈ V * and v / ∈ W * and
where b 0 , b 1 ∈ .
and for b 1 = 0,
As b 0 and b 1 can be chosen arbitrarily
for any c 0 , c 1 , ..., c n ∈ . Replace v with v in F K and X K and add to W * .
Repeat until there are no more elements used in F K such that Case 2 holds. So X K is of full rank. Note that the set from which the elements are chosen is uncountable.
Step 3.
Step 3.1 For any v ∈ V , by Sklar's Theorem (Theorem 1) F (v) = C(v) and so
So letting a ∈ (0, 1),
Step (1), there exists an > 0 such that
for all v ∈ V .
Step 3.2. By Sklar's Theorem (Theorem 1),
* and from Step (1)
for the (K + 1) J elements of V * described in Step (2). In matrix form
where p K is a (K +1) J ×1 vector of parameters of P N K and h is a (K +1) J ×1
vector of ones. So, re-writing we have
We can re-write the equation
where e K is a (K + 1) J × 1 vector and each element, e Ki ∈ (− , ).
From
Step (2) X K is full-rank so
Step 3.3 Now consider the difference between the estimated polynomial Q K and the approximate polynomial P N K for any v ∈ V . Let the vector of variables (similar to rows of X K ) for v be denoted x.
where e 1 ∈ (− , ). Let
Note that
Step 3.5 From Step (3.1) for any a ∈ (0, 1) and all v ∈ V
Theorem 2 presents sufficient conditions for the full joint distribution to be identified, or more accurately, the sufficient conditions for an approximation of the full joint distribution to be identified. It is not clear from the statement of the result or from the proof itself how good an approximation the identified polynomial may provide.
To give the reader a greater a sense of the quality of the approximation, Table 1 presents the probability that approximation differs from the actual function by less than 0.1, for each K 1 to 10 and for from 0.1 to .0001 and 
assuming two products (J = 2) (top) and three products (J = 3) (bottom). The table is created by taking the RHS of Equation (27) where M = 1 , a = 0.1 and randomly drawing values for u 1 , u K and for the marginal probabilities used to determine x and X K . 4 Note that in a particular application the values of x and X K will be known to the econometrian and a similar table could be constructed for the actual data used.
The table shows two things we may have expected. First, the tighter the estimate on the observed data ( ) the higher the probability that the approximation will differ from the actual probability by less than 10 percentage points across the whole domain. Second, the higher the order of the polynomial approximation, the lower the probability that the approximation will differ from the actual probability by less than 10 percentage points across the whole domain. The table shows that in the two product/choice case, if a polynomial of order 5 is less than 0.0001 from the actual copula on the observed data, then with 90% probability the estimated copula of order 5 will be less than .1 from the actual probability across the whole domain.
The table illustrates that a tension may exist between getting a tighter approximation on the observed data by estimating a higher order polyno-mial, and the higher order polynomial providing less accurate approximation away from the observed data. This highlights an important caveat on the approximation result presented in this paper. This is not an arbitrary approximation. That is, there is no sense in which the approximation gets better as the order of the polynomial increases, for example. The quality of the approximation depends on the data used to estimate the polynomial. Given this, it is important in any application for the econometrician to give the reader a sense of the quality of the approximation.
Identification in the Roy Model
This section considers the problem of identification in the Roy Model. In this model the econometrician is limited to observing the outcome of the chosen treatment or product. The model assumes consumers choose the treatment or product that provides the highest utility given the observed prices.
Consider a model with I consumers and J products. Consumer i observes her vector of values over the J products, v i ∈ [v,v] J and a vector of
Assumption 4 v i = {v i1 , ..., v iJ } ∼ F where v i is iid for all i ∈ I.
Assumption 5 Consumer i has utility U ij = v ij − p j if she chooses product j.
Assumption 6 Consumer i chooses one item j if and only if
Assumption 4 simplifies the problem by not allowing correlation of outcomes across consumers. Assumptions 5 and 6 state that each consumer's utility is linear in "money" and each consumer chooses the product that gives her the highest utility. Note that Assumption 5 is a monotonic transformation of the utility presented in Heckman and Honore (1990) . Assumptions 4, 5 and 6 state that the consumer and the econometrician observe the same set of signals regarding the likely outcome of the chosen treatment, i.e. v ij . This may be too strong a requirement for some settings of interest.
Definition 2 LetṼ
* for a given vector of price p be such that for allṽ j ∈Ṽ j * whereṼ
Definition 2 is the set of "cut off" values for a given vector of prices. It shows at what value consumer i will switch from product j to product k for given prices p j and p k .
Proposition 1 If Assumptions (1 -6) hold and for all i in a large I we observe v ij for i's product choice j ∈ J given an observed price vector p, then
Proof The proof proceeds as follows.
Step (1) shows that any F (v) can written as the sum of J blocks which are formed when a function "bisects" the J-dimensional space.
Step (2) shows that the "cut off" values from Definition 2 are such a function.
Step (3) shows the observed probabilities for each treatment are the blocks described above and so a particular cumulative probability can be written as the sum of the observed probabilities.
Step (4) shows that this can be done for any element of the set defined in Definition 2.
Step 1. Note that (29) where F −j is the multi-variate cumulative distribution in every dimension except j, h ij is a function mapping from v j to v i such that h ij (h ji (v)) = v and h ji (h ik (v)) = h jk (v). The h function "bisects" the J-dimensional space, separating it into J blocks.
Step 2. By assumptions 4, 5 and 6, and for a large I the probability of observing valuations less v in product 1 is given by
whereṽ jk (v) = v − p k + p j (see Definition 2) and h j1 (v) =ṽ j1 (v). To see the second, consider the two properties mentioned above. First it has an inverse because it is monotonic. To see the second property, note thatṽ
Step 3. From
Step (2)
Step 4. This same argument can be made for any value v ∈ [v,v] in any dimension j so given Definition 2, F (v) is identified for all v ∈Ṽ * . Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 states that the joint distribution F is identified for a subset of the domain, namely,Ṽ * . The argument made here is similar to the argument made in Heckman and Honore (1990) for the two good case. The proof shows that for a given vector of prices it is possible use revealed preference and the observed frequency of outcomes to infer information about particular joint probabilities. However this is not quite enough to use Sklar's Theorem and Theorem 2. The following two assumptions and lemma provide the necessary conditions to apply these theorems.
Assumption 7 Let the observed price vector p be such that {v j , v j } ∈Ṽ * j such that |v j − v j | > 0 for all j ∈ {1, ..., J}.
Assumption 8 f j (v) is non-linear on [v,v] for all j ∈ {1, ..., J}.
Assumption 7 states that the prices cannot be so high that no consumer will ever choose one of the products. Assumption 8 is a technical assumption on the underlying value distribution.
Condition (1) This lemma then allows the following proposition to summarize the identification result for the Roy model. (1 -8) hold, for all j ∈ J we observe F j , for all i in a large I we observe v ij for i's product choice j ∈ J given an observed price vector p, then for any K ∈ N, ∃ > 0 such that as → 0
Proposition 2 If Assumptions
Proof. The proof follows in a straight forward fashion from the results derived above. By Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, ∃V * ⊂ V such that F is identified on V * . By assumption F j is identified on V j for all j ∈ {1, ..., J} and so by Theorem 2, F is identified on V up to an approximation. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 summarizes the main result of the section. Given the Roy model, a model in which consumers observe their relative valuations for different products and a price vector, then choose the product that provides the highest net utility, it is possible to identify the joint distribution up to an approximation. This extends the identification results presented in Heckman and Honore (1990), providing a method for identification whose data requirement is not much greater than currently used methods but without the strong parametric assumptions.
It should be noted that the model presented above and in Heckman and Honore (1990) does make quite strong assumptions about what consumers know about their "outcomes" under the different treatments. These assumptions are pretty standard in the auction context discussed below, they nevertheless may be too strong for specific policy applications.
Identification in an Auction Model
This sections applies the results presented above to an auction setting where there are simultaneous sealed-bid auctions for differentiated products. A lot of the intuition from the previous section carries over to this section, however things are more complicated because prices are determined endogenously and only auction prices are observed.
Consider a bidder i who can bid in up to J simultaneous sealed bid auctions for J differentiated items.
Assumption 9 M ∈ N bidders face between 1 and J simultaneous sealedbid auctions.
Assumption 10 Each bidder chooses 1 auction.
Assumptions 4 and 9 are the private values assumption and the simultaneous auctions assumption, respectively. Assumption 10 states that each bidder will only enter one auction. This is equivalent to Assumption 6 presented above for the Roy model and simplifies the problem. It also seems relatively realistic for the case of online car auctions for example.
The game is formally described in the following existence theorem.
and is represented as a randomized-strategy profile σ ∈ × i∈M × v i ∈V ∆(S)
Proof The proof follows in a straightforward fashion from the results presented in Myerson (1991) .
Step 1 shows that there is a type-agent equilibrium of a similar finite game.
Step 2 argues that the equilibrium of the finite game is an equilibrium of the original game.
Step 1. Consider a modified game Γ 1 which differs from Γ in that S 1 = {0, 1}
J and b ij = b(v ij ), where b (v ij ) > 0. That is, it is assumed bidders bid a monotonic function of their value once they enter auction j. Following Harsayni and Selten this modified game can be represented as a finite type-agent game and so a Nash equilibrium exists by Theorem 3.1 (Myerson (1991) ).
Step 2. Γ can be represented as a two-period game in which bidder's choose the auction in the first period and the amount to bid in the second period. S = {S 1 , S 2 } where S 1 is as in
Step (1) and
where G is the distribution of valuations such that if a bidder chooses some auction −j they are assigned a valuation of v for auction j. If the bidder chooses auction j they are assigned their valuation v ij for auction j. G is determined by the equilibrium actions of the game and is known to the bidders. Note that the bidders do not observe actual entry choices just the equilibrium strategies. Given standard results, the Nash equilibrium of Γ 2j is such that b ij = b(v ij ).
Step 3. From steps (1) and (2), there is exists a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of Γ, therefore there exists a Nash equilibrium. Q.E.D.
5
Theorem 3 formalizes the model and states that there is at least one Bayes Nash equilibrium. The proof uses the fact that there are well known results for the equilibrium of the second-stage auction game, which allows the game to be represented as a finite game for which existence results are well known.
Note that in any empirical application it will be necessary for the equilibrium to remain stable. Further, it should be possible to use the data on prices to determine the equilibrium prices necessary for estimating the model. This would be similar to the "two-step" approach suggested in a number of applied papers in empirical IO and labor economics.
The following definition presents the analogous set of "cut off" values for the auction case. Note that here the cut off values are determined by expected prices which are in turn determined by the cut off values. The result above tells us that there in fact is an equilibrium set of cut off values.
Definition 3 LetV
* for allv j ∈V j * whereV
for all v j >v j and all k ∈ J,
for all v j <v j and at least one k ∈ J.
Given this definition, the proposition shows that we can identify F (v 1 , ..., v J ) for {v 1 , ..., v J } ∈V * when the number of bidders is observed. The main result uses this proposition to present sufficient conditions for the identification of F (.).
Proposition 3 Given Assumptions (1 -4), 9 and 10, if we observe M bidders bidding in J ≥ 2 sealed bid auctions for J different items and the distribution of prices {p 1 , ..., p J }, then F (v 1 , ..., v J ) is identified where {v 1 , ..., v J } ∈ V * .
Proof. The proof has four steps.
Step 1 sets things up by partitioning the valuation vectors into a finite set K.
Step 2 writes down the "almost" order statistic probabilities given the observed price.
Step 3 uses the result in step 2 and induction to identify the probability a particular bidder will bid p k in auction j.
Step 4 presents a similar argument presented in the proof of Proposition 1 and shows that the information provided can be used to infer the joint distribution for a particular set of valuation vectors.
Step 1. Let [v,v] be segmented in to K disjoint sets of equal length such that the union is equal to the original set (partitioned).
and
That is, we will approximate [v,v] with a discrete set of K elements such that
Further, note the observed sequence of prices {p j } will also be approximated in this way, where {p jK } denotes the observed sequence from discrete set {v 1 , v 2 , ..., v K }.
Step 2. Given this approximation, without loss of generality consider the probability distribution of the price of item 1 (of J), p 1 .
( 39) where P (M, I) is the appropriate permutation formula, I denotes the order statistic of interest, i.e. I = 2 for a second-price sealed bid auction and
whereṽ jk is such that U ij (ṽ jk ) = U i1 (b −1 (p k )) for all j ≥ 2 and b(v j ) is the bid function.
So first note that F 2..J refers to every dimension except 1. That is if J = 2 it would be F 2 , the marginal on 2. Second note thatṽ j refers to the valuation that when bid for item j gives the same surplus to the bidder as bidding p k for item 1. From above, G 1k is the marginal cumulative distribution up toṽ jk in every dimension except 1 conditional on the value for item 1 being equal to b −1 (p k ) multiplied by the marginal probability of
. It equals the probability that a single bidder will bid p k on item 1. H 1k denotes the additions of the G 1k 's up to K. It is the probability that a single bidder will bid greater or equal to p k for item 1. Note that the probability that all the other M bidders have values for item 1 that are equal to or less than p K or do not bid on item 1 is 1. These equations have a similar flavor to the standard order statistics equations, unfortunately they are not quite the same and the identification argument is not as straightforward.
where F −j is the multi-variate cumulative distribution in every dimension except j, h ij is a function mapping from v j to v i such that h ij (h ji (v)) = v and h ji (h ik (v)) = h jk (v). The h function "bisects" the J-dimensional space, separating it into J blocks.
Second note that from Equation (41) and (42), that
where h j1 (v) =ṽ j (v). To see this, consider the two properties mentioned above. First it has an inverse because it is monotonic. To see monotonicity note thatṽ j (v) is the implicit function defined by
is increasing in v for all j we have the result. The utility of entering auction j is
Take the derivative of U ij with respect to v j . From Equation (46) and the Envelope Theorem,
Soṽ j (v) is monotonic for all j. To see the second part, note thatṽ
) and by monotonicity we have the result. The argument can be made for each item so
Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 states that the joint distribution F is identified for a subset of the domain, namely,V * . The argument is similar to the argument presented for the equivalent proposition in the Roy model section (Proposition 1). The argument is complicated by the fact that relative expected prices are determined endogenously in the auction model. As was the case for the Roy model, this result is not quite enough to use Sklar's Theorem and Theorem 2. The following assumption is somewhat stronger than the equivalent assumption presented in the previous section (Assumption 7).
The following result is equivalent to Lemma 1 presented above. To use Sklar's Theorem we will also need to be able to identify the marginal distributions. If we observe items with no competitive auctions, the number of bidders in those auctions and the prices from those auctions, then we can use the result from Athey and Haile (2002) to identify F j .
Theorem 4 (Athey and Haile (2002) ) If Assumptions (1,9 -10) hold, we observe price p j from a series of auctions for item j where there are no competitive auctions and we observe the number of bidders N j then F j is identified.
The following proposition states the main result of the section. Given Sklar's Theorem and the continuity assumptions it is possible to identify the joint value distribution up to an arbitrarily close approximation. Note that to use the Athey and Haile (2002) result we also need to observe bidders bidding in auctions in which there is no competition.
Proposition 4 If Assumptions (1 -4) and (8 -11) hold, if for each item j we observe p j in a series of auctions and observe M bidders bidding on J simultaneous sealed-bid auctions and p j and N j for each j of J auctions in which the bidders had only one auction, then for any K ∈ N, ∃ > 0 such that as → 0
Proof. The proof follows from the results derived above. By Proposition 3 and Lemma 2, ∃V * ⊂ V such that F is identified on V * . By Theorem 4 and the appropriate assumptions, F j is identified on V j for all j ∈ {1, ..., J} and so by Theorem 2, F is identified on V up to an approximation. Q.E.D.
The proposition states that if we observe bidders bidding in simultaneous auctions for J differentiated products it is possible to estimate an approximation to the joint value distribution of the J differentiated goods.
Conclusion
The paper extends results for the Roy model presented in Heckman and Honore (1990) . In particular, the paper shows that for one vector of prices it is possible to identify an approximation to the full distribution with data on the marginal probabilities and partial identification of the distribution from structural assumptions. The paper argues the data requirements are modest and it is not necessary to make strong parametric assumptions. That said, the standard Roy model assumes the decision maker and the econometrician have access to the same set of signals as to the likely outcomes of the treatments, which may limit the applicability of the results. Moreover, the paper does not show the joint distribution can be identified exactly, rather it shows an approximation to the joint distribution can be identified.
The Roy model results are applied to the auction context. In particular, the results are applied to a setting where the bidder must choose between simultaneous sealed bid auctions for differentiated products. While the flavor of the results is similar to the Roy model, things are more complicated because expected prices are determined endogenously. In addition, in the auction context it is only possible to observe an order statistic of the distribution of outcomes.
